Good and bad times of social innovations: the case of Universal basic income in Finland by Koistinen, Pertti & Perkiö, Johanna
 
 
This document has been downloaded from  
TamPub – The Institutional Repository of University of Tampere 
 
 
Publisher's version 
 
 
The permanent address of the publication is 
http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:uta-201601191088 
 
 
Author(s):   Koistinen, Pertti; Perkiö, Johanna 
Title:  Good and bad times of social innovations: the case of 
Universal basic income in Finland 
Year:   2014 
Journal Title:   Basic Income Studies 
Vol and number:  9 : 1-2 
Pages:   25-57 
ISSN:   1932-0813 
Discipline:   Sociology; Social policy 
School /Other Unit:  School of Social Sciences and Humanities 
Item Type:   Journal Article 
Language:   en 
DOI:   http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bis-2014-0009 
URN:   URN:NBN:fi:uta-201601191088 
Abstract:  This article draws on innovation and agenda-setting 
theories to identify critical points in the realization of basic 
income in Finland. Our empirical data comprise 13 models 
of either unconditional basic income or social security 
reform proposals with some similarity to basic income. 
The models examined were published in Finland between 
1984 and 2011. Using these data, we build a conceptual 
framework that enables us to discuss the role of the 
content, players, political and macro-economic context, 
and public interpretations in the successes and failures of 
the basic income initiatives. 
Subject:  perustulo; innovaatioteoriat; agenda-setting teoria; basic 
income; innovation theories; agenda-setting theories 
 
 
All material supplied via TamPub is protected by copyright and other intellectual 
property rights, and duplication or sale of all part of any of the repository collections 
is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use 
or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for 
any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or 
otherwise to anyone who is not an authorized user. 
Pertti Koistinen* and Johanna Perkiö
Good and Bad Times of Social Innovations:
The Case of Universal Basic Income in
Finland
Abstract: This article draws on innovation and agenda-setting theories to iden-
tify critical points in the realization of basic income in Finland. Our empirical
data comprise 13 models of either unconditional basic income or social security
reform proposals with some similarity to basic income. The models examined
were published in Finland between 1984 and 2011. Using these data, we build
a conceptual framework that enables us to discuss the role of the content,
players, political and macro-economic context, and public interpretations in
the successes and failures of the basic income initiatives.
Keywords: basic income, innovation theories, agenda-setting theories, social
security reform
DOI 10.1515/bis-2014-0009
1 Introduction
Since the maturity of Western welfare states in the 1980s, there has been no new
implementation of innovative social programmes. Despite rapid changes in the
economy and labour market, social protection systems have mostly experienced
only minor modification. In the context of the recent economic crisis, the
dominant policy line has been to retrench prevailing social policy systems, cut
public expenditure, and narrow the eligibility criteria for existing benefit
systems.
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Despite this mainstream tendency of cutbacks, there have been initiatives to
introduce fundamental social security reforms. A persistent idea in European
and global discussions is universal basic income (BI): an income granted to all
members of society as a right without means testing or conditions. Several
initiatives for BI in its various forms have been made in different political and
socio-economic contexts, but the reform has nowhere succeeded in becoming
reality. In the past few years, the idea of BI has spread rapidly to countries
where it was previously unknown, and it has gained increasing attention in
countries where the debate was already established.
Using the BI debate in Finland as a case study, we attempt to build a
conceptual framework to identify the reasons for the failure of BI’s realization.
We draw on innovation and agenda-setting theories to analyse the 13 models of
universal unconditional BI or related reform proposals that were published in
Finland from 1984 to 2011.1 When analysing these initiatives, we pay close
attention to the following dimensions: (1) the content of the initiative and its
“degree of innovation” in relation to the present welfare system, (2) the political
position of the initiators and adherents, (3) the political and socio-economic
context for undertaking the initiative, and (4) public interpretations of the
initiative and the outcomes that followed.
Finland represents an interesting case for an analysis of BI’s non-
realization for several reasons. Finland belongs to the family of Nordic coun-
tries, which have a long tradition and commitment to Universalism in social
and welfare policies. Those ideas have been especially reflected in education
and social and health services, but there are also some elements of
Universalism in the other areas of society, such as pension schemes. The
idea of BI, in one form or another, has featured regularly in Finnish academic
and political discourse since the 1970s. What makes Finland’s case especially
interesting is that the idea of BI has always received support, not only from
academics and social movements but also from some influential politicians
and parties.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we
present our theoretical framework, which is used to identify the main reasons
for the failure of the BI proposal. In Section 3, we describe our data and
1 In December 2013 (after this research was conducted), the liberal think tank Libera published
a proposal for a “Life Account”, which has some features of BI. The proposal (in English)
can be downloaded at: http://libera.fi/libera-uusi/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Perustili_EN_
131210b.pdf.
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research methods. In Section 4, we analyse the examples of BI models or
related reform proposals made in Finland. The first part of the empirical
analysis consists of a descriptive analysis of the actors and discourses, and
the second part applies the perspective of innovation and agenda-setting
theories to identify internal and contextual factors that may be relevant in
explaining the reasons for the substantial or gradual failure of BI initiatives.
In Section 5, we discuss the results in the light of the previous studies, and
Section 6 concludes our article.
2 Theoretical approach
Innovation theories have been developed for various purposes in the fields of
the technology research, political studies, sociology, human geography, and the
economic sciences. They seek to explain how, why, and at what rate ideas and
concepts, technical information, and practices spread through cultures and are
adopted by individuals, organizations, and political communities (Berry & Berry,
2007; Rogers, 1962; Wejnert, 2002).
In the political and social sciences, innovation theories have been used,
for instance, to analyse the spread of mass education, social security systems,
and nation-state models among the world’s political states (Thomas, Meyer,
Ramirez, & Boli, 1987). They have also been used to analyse welfare policies
and land reform models (Thomas & Lauerdale, 1987), educational models
(Boli-Bennett & Meyer, 1978; Boli-Bennett & Ramirez, 1987; Inkeles &
Sirowy, 1983), state lottery and innovative tax policies (Berry & Berry, 1990,
1992), and the role of policy entrepreneurs in approval of an education reform
(Mintrom, 1997). The concept of social innovation has been used to refer to
innovations which aim “to produce long lasting outcomes that are relevant for
(parts of) society, given the needs and challenges with which (groups in)
society wrestling ... [to] ... create and add to public values that are considered
important”, and to “change the social relationships and the ‘playing rules’
between the involved stakeholders” (Bekkers, Tummers, & Voorberg, 2013,
pp. 2–3).
The innovation theory perspective is supplemented by agenda-setting the-
ories, especially John W. Kingdon’s (2011) theory on how issues make their way
onto public policy agendas and gain the attention of governments. Agenda-
setting theories help to identify the processes – within the press, civil society,
parties, and interest groups – that eventually lead to some issues and innova-
tions becoming the concerns of policymakers.
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The conditions for innovation in the fields of technology and social policy
are not the same. It has been noted that social policy institutions – due to
various mutually intertwined vested interests and complex path dependen-
cies – are often reluctant to implement large-scale reforms (Pierson, 2000,
2004). Therefore, public policymaking is often reactive and incremental
(Greener, 2005; Pierson, 2000, 2004; Thelen, 1999). However, at certain
critical times institutions may change rapidly (Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 2011).
The possibility for change often arises from a large-scale crisis in prevalent
practices and continuous failures to overcome problems with the existing
means (Hall, 1993).
In history, we can find examples of times when social policy was the
subject of active development and enlargement, and social innovations
received large acceptance. However, in almost all cases it has taken decades
to develop an idea into a true and well-functioning institution (Kangas, 2006;
Titmuss, 1974, p. 131). For instance, it took more than 20 years to institutiona-
lize programmes in the Finnish child benefit and child care systems, and
unemployment insurance was debated in the Finnish parliament for decades
(Anttonen & Sipilä, 2006; Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009; Kangas, 2006; Kuivalainen,
2012). The principle of equal pay for equal work took almost 50 years to
become internationally accepted, institutionalized, and ratified as a social
right (Määttä, 2008).
The processes that lead some innovations to be finally accepted and imple-
mented and others discarded are not well known. Ideas with seemingly few
prospects may receive attention when the “political winds” or paradigms shift as
a result of an economic crisis, a shift in political power relations or the influence
of strong social movements. For Kingdon (2011), the key to understanding
change is the coupling of three largely independent streams: problems, policies,
and politics. He argues, at certain critical times, “(s)olutions become joined to
problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces” (Kingdon,
2011, 20). The situation where a long-considered idea suddenly finds its invita-
tion is called a “policy window” (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 128–130). However, in order
to be regarded as realistic alternatives, new ideas need to be well known
and sufficiently cogent. Kingdon presents the following criteria for proposals
to receive serious consideration: their “technical feasibility, their fit with
dominant values and the current national mood, their budgetary workability,
and the political support or opposition they might experience” (Kingdon, 2011,
pp. 19–20).
When political conditions change, the discursive battle over interpretations
plays a crucial role (Hall, 1993). Besides being technically feasible and capable
of addressing the most pressing problems of the day, the innovation must also
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be attractive to the public and decision-makers (Chong & Druckman, 2007;
Kangas, Niemelä, & Varjonen, 2013; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, pp. 11–13). The
interpretation of an idea in public discussion often seems to be a decisive
element for the idea’s further success (Hiilamo & Kangas, 2009; Kangas et al.,
2013). Researchers have noted that the familiarity associated with a new idea
and its compatibility with the local norms, values, and ideologies relates to the
rate of adoption (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Rogers, 1962; Wejnert, 2002, p. 303).
Ideas that appear too unfamiliar or radical often find support from low-status
and marginal groups, whereas high-status actors adopt innovations that are
mainly non-controversial and consistent with established norms (Rogers, 1962;
Wejnert, 2002, p. 305).
In order to be self-sustainable, the innovation must be widely adopted
among individuals, groups, organizations, or national polities. Within the
rate of adoption, there is a point at which an innovation reaches critical
mass. From this tipping point, the number of individual adopters ensures
that continued adoption of the innovation is self-sustaining (Rogers, 1962;
Wejnert, 2002). However, some actors have more political, cultural, and
material resources than others, and better access to decision-makers and
the media (see Kingdon, 2011; Korpi, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 2003; Mintrom,
1997). They can thus play a more crucial role in spreading the idea throughout
society.
When explaining the failure of BI’s realization, authors have emphasized
factors such as its weak and divided political support (Andersson & Kangas,
2002; De Wispelaere & Noguera, 2012; Vanderborght, 2006) and its unsuitability
for the prevailing social security systems and ideologies (Andersson, 2000;
Julkunen, 2009). De Wispelaere and Noguera (2012, pp. 22–23) argue that one
significant reason for the failure of the BI proposal is that it has often been
supported by groups and individuals that are politically weak; thus, it has not
been able to move up the policy agenda. In some instances, support from a
particular marginalized group or political faction has prevented other, more
powerful agents from offering valuable support. In the Finnish context,
Julkunen (2009) and Andersson and Kangas (2002) note that although there is
a high degree of support for generous social protection among Finns, BI’s
unconditionality principle is in contradiction with the strong work ethic of the
Nordic welfare model. Furthermore, political support for BI is scattered in the
sense that adherents from different ideological backgrounds do not work
together to advance the idea.
Based on our reading of innovation and agenda-setting theories, we distin-
guish the following four dimensions as central in identifying the drivers and
barriers of social innovations such as BI:
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● The qualities of the innovation itself: its economic viability and empirical
credibility, its alleged problem-solving capacity, its attractiveness to the
public, and its “degree of innovation”, i.e. the magnitude of change it will
introduce to the existing system;
● The actors (initiators and adherents): the credibility of adherents, their social
position and power resources, channels for communicating the idea, and the
presence of advocacy coalitions;
● Culture: the extent to which the proposed idea is compatible with the
prevalent norms, values, and sensibilities;
● The economic and political context: the economic cycle, the parties
present in the government, the objectives expressed in the government
platform, the dominant theories and paradigms concerning the economic
and public policy, and the previous policy choices and institutional path
dependencies.
3 Data and methods
Our empirical data comprise 13 models that are either a model for uncondi-
tional BI or a social security reform proposal that is somewhat similar to BI.
These models were published between 1984 and 2011 (for detailed information
on all of the models, see Appendix). The models have been created by aca-
demics, individual activists, and political parties. Six of the models represent a
partial BI, which means that the benefit is granted unconditionally to all
citizens/residents, but the sum is not sufficient to provide a livelihood without
income from other sources.2 In two models from the 1980s, the amount of BI is
considered to be rather high, which means that they could be classified as
models of full BI (i.e. a payment sufficiently high to account for all living
expenses). In addition, there are models that propose a BI-like social security
that would be either conditional or targeted at some particular groups or
specific situations.
All proposals except for one (the Young Finns 1998) have been studied as
original versions. Other relevant information describing the socio-economic and
political context and the reception of the proposals has been collected system-
atically from various sources (newspapers, government platforms, government
2 In recent discussions, the proposed amount for a partial BI in Finland has varied between
€440 and €620.
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compositions, statistics). In addition, we used research reports, dissertations,
and other relevant secondary sources.
The analysis of the successes and failures of the Finnish BI proposals is
based on a systematic literature and document survey. In order to qualify the
analysis, we cross-checked various information sources. Methodologically, this
means that we followed the rules of critical source analysis (Haapala, 1989;
Hyytiäinen & Tähtinen, 2008; Kalela, 2002) and the ideas of conceptual analysis
(Furner, 2006; Levering, 2002).
In order to make our analysis more systematic and transparent, we devel-
oped an analytical frame based on the assumptions of previous studies and
innovation theories. Using these dimensions, we aimed to identify the precondi-
tions for the successes and failures of the BI proposals. The dimensions of
analysis are as follows:
– What: What was proposed exactly? What were the objectives of the
proposal? What was its relation to the existing social security system?
– Who: Who was proposing what to whom, and who was the carrier of this
message? What were the means of distributing this information?
– Macro-economic context: What was the macro-economic context (main
features and cycles, level of welfare, unemployment rate) at the time of
the proposal? How was this macro-economic context reflected in the
proposal?
– Political context: What were the political power relations and
objectives of the government? Did the proposal have a special political
motive, such as a local crisis, an election campaign or a policy programme,
etc.?
– Reception: What was the reception of the proposal? How it was considered
by the other actors? Which groups supported it and which groups opposed
it? What were the arguments for and against it as expressed by individuals,
parties, and interest groups? How was the proposal seen to change the
prevailing systems of social security? Was it viewed as a positive input, a
competitor, or as a threat to the system?
– Outcomes: Did the proposal trigger some minor reforms or other measures?
What were the reasons for the death of the proposal? Did the proposal re-
emerge later?
Applying these dimensions and collecting available information on each
proposal, we constructed a table summarizing the characteristics of BI and
related proposals in Finland in from 1984 to 2011 (see Appendix). In the follow-
ing two sections, we first provide a descriptive analysis and then analyse each
proposal using the analytical frame.
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4 Basic income initiatives in Finland
4.1 Actors and discourses
There has been some discussion regarding the idea BI or negative income tax
(NIT)3 among Finnish academics and policymakers since the 1970s, but the
debate became more topical in the early 1980s.
The first concrete proposal was made in 1984 by two academics, Professors
Jaakko Uotila and Paavo Uusitalo. In their book, they proposed sabbatical leave
combined with a citizen’s wage4 as a voluntary option for each citizen. The
sabbatical leave would be available every ten years and it was assumed that it
would produce mild work redistribution.
The second model was published in 1987 by sociologist Matti Virtanen. It
was the first actual universal BI model designed to support the transformation
from an industrial to an information society and the green restructuring of
production. Virtanen’s model was soon followed by left-wing economist Jan
Otto Andersson’s model (1988) and Social Democrat economist Pekka
Korpinen’s (1989) model. Both aimed to reduce working time in order to allow
more space for free time activities.
In 1988, Olli Rehn (then a Centre Party MP) and David Pemberton (the Green
League) took the initiative to create a group that would discuss and promote the
idea of BI. The group included representatives from most political parties. Its
secretary, Ilpo Lahtinen (1992), wrote a book that reflected the ideas discussed
by the group and proposed the introduction of a partial BI (see the definition of
partial BI in Section 3). The book appeared in 1992, in the midst of the deep
economic recession (Andersson, 2000; Ikkala, 2012, p. 67).
Throughout the 1990s, Lahtinen’s model was followed by a series of other
proposals for a partial BI or related reform. In 1994, after the worst of the
recession, Osmo Soininvaara (a Green League MP), released a model first in a
report ordered by the Ministry of Social Affairs, and later in his award-win-
ning book (Soininvaara, 1994). He introduced a detailed proposal for a partial
BI scheme with an analysis of its implications for public finances. His
main objective was to increase the attractiveness of irregular and low-paid
3 Negative income tax (NIT) is a model for implementing a guaranteed minimum income
system where people earning below a certain amount receive supplemental pay from the
government instead of paying taxes. It produces similar outcomes as BI.
4 The term “citizen’s wage” has sometimes been used in Finland to refer to a conditional
participatory income and sometimes to refer to BI.
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employment. A slightly modified version of the model was later approved by
his party.
In 1997, Kati Peltola (a social policy expert and a left-wing politician)
released a model of “ground income and civil work”. It was a proposal for a
voluntary participatory income combined with extensive tax reform.
Soon after, in 1998, the first models by political parties were released. In its
parliamentary election campaign, the Young Finns (a small liberal party with
two seats in the parliament at the time) made a detailed proposal for a partial BI
with a reduced rate for minors and a higher rate for pensioners (Mattila, 2001,
p. 227). The Centre Party (at the time the second largest party) also included the
idea of a conditional BI in its “work reform” proposal (The Centre Party, 1998a,
1998b). In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the Young Finns lost both its
seats and the Centre Party remained in opposition (Andersson, 2000; Ikkala,
2012, p. 69; Julkunen, 2009).
At the beginning of the 21st century, there was virtually no discussion of BI
despite the publication of Anita Mattila’s doctoral dissertation (2001) in which
she compared previously published models and developed two of her own. The
models represented an idea of an “adjusted BI”, which proposed only a minor
reform in the existing framework of social protection.
From 2006 onwards, after some years of silence, the discussion on BI arose
swiftly in civil society and in the media. In 2006–2007 and again in 2012–2013,
public debate was widespread. New models were released before the parliamen-
tary elections in 2007 by the Green League and before the parliamentary elec-
tions 2011 by the Left Alliance. In both models, a micro-simulation analysis was
made on the required tax-rates and BI’s budgetary implications. Both models
were intended to replace the existing income-transfer schemes, excluding hous-
ing benefits, social assistance and earnings-related benefits. The Green League
claimed their model was neutral for public financing, whereas the Left Alliance’s
model aimed at progressive income distribution.
Besides discussions on these concrete models, in recent years there has also
been a range of civil society activities and campaigns that has kept the BI
discourse alive.
4.2 Successes, failures and continuities
4.2.1 Content and degree of innovation
Eight of the thirteen proposals can be categorized as models of partial or full
unconditional BI. They often include an unconditional BI integrated with other
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benefit systems like housing benefits, social insurance, and social assistance.
One of the proposals considers BI itself to be conditional (Peltola, 1997), three
target it only at particular groups (the Centre Party 1998; Mattila, 2001 I & II),
and one limits the eligibility to some specific situations (Uotila & Uusitalo, 1984).
All proposals include tax-reform of some kind.
During the period analysed, the BI models have become more elaborate in
their technical features and cost–benefit calculations. The earliest proposals are
rather rough estimates of the potential components of the model, whereas the
two most recent models (the Green League 2007; see also Ylikahri 2012 and the
Left Alliance 2011) have a detailed design and use micro-simulation analysis
with real tax and benefit data to estimate the effects of the models on public
finances and different types of household.
All models discuss BI in the framework of their contemporary social and
labour market policies. They reflect upon the gaps and failures of the prevailing
system and allege to solve problems such as structural unemployment, benefit
non-take-up or incentive traps. BI is presented rather as a partial renewal of the
existing systems rather than a radically new principle. In general, the earlier
models (e.g. Matti Virtanen, Jan Otto Andersson, and Pekka Korpinen in the late
1980s) are more visionary and the latter ones more pragmatic (e.g. Soininvaara,
1994; the Centre Party 1998 a & b; Anita Mattila, 2001; the Green League 2007).
The general objectives of all proposals are to increase flexibility in working time
and support activity and new forms of work.
All models largely focus on the problem of unemployment. However, there
is a difference between the earlier and latter models; whereas the models of the
1980s aim at solving the problem of unemployment by reducing the labour
supply (by introducing sabbatical leave, job-sharing, and new civil society
activities), the latter BI models in most cases aim to increase the labour supply
by improving work incentives.
The models vary in their “degree of innovation”, i.e. the magnitude of
change they intend to introduce to the social protection system. This may
concern either the technical qualities of the model, or the values and principles
on which the model was built. Most of the proposals from the 1980s represent a
more radical departure from the principles of the existing welfare model than
those published from the 1990s onwards. They embrace rather post-productivist
visions with less material consumption and a more relaxed way of living.
However, the technical components of the early models are not as elaborate as
those that came later.
The sabbatical leave proposal (1984), the proposal of the Centre Party
(1998), and the two models of researcher Anita Mattila (2001) aim only at a
slight modification of the existing system. The models of Ilpo Lahtinen (1992),
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Osmo Soininvaara (1994), the Young Finns (1998), and the Green League (2007)
aim at establishing a new social security scheme, but do not challenge the
objectives or the principles of the contemporary social and labour market
policies. The same applies to Kati Peltola’s (1997) model, which has an innova-
tive design, but it leans heavily on the protestant work ethic. The model of the
Left Alliance (2011) aims to change not only the system of social protection but
also income distribution. It draws its justification more from the Nordic welfare
tradition than from current political discourse.
4.2.2 Initiators and promoters
The initiators ranged from individual activists and academics (nine models) to
political parties (four models). The earliest models were published by academics
and the most recent by parties. All individual models were published in books
that discussed a wide range of contemporary social problems, whereas the
models of the political parties were published as reports or policy papers.
With the exception of Uotila and Uusitalo (1984), all initiators had some kind
link to party politics. The political background of the initiators ranges from the
left to the right.
Other than the Centre Party’s 1998 model, all the models were proposed by
small- or medium-sized parties or individuals in fairly powerful positions, but
not by those at the top of the political hierarchy. Most of the proposals were
made as individual attempts without larger and systematic promotion or the
backing of powerful coalitions. The BI initiators did not often act jointly or seek
shared values and objectives.
By the same token, we find that many of the active promoters of BI either
forgot or gave up their previous ideas and efforts when they achieved a political
position that could allow them to act to implement the programme. This hap-
pened to Osmo Soininvaara in 2000 when he became the Minister of Social
Affairs in the government led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and again in
2007 when he was elected one of the leaders of the committee for reforming
social protection (the SATA committee). The same happened with Olli Rehn,
who, when he became a successful politician and European Commissioner,
seemed to forget his support for BI as one of the founding members of Ilpo
Lahtinen’s BI working group (1988–1991). This tendency also applies to Pekka
Korpinen, who later as a Deputy Mayor of Helsinki never resurrected his BI
proposal from 1989. The medium-sized parties, the Green League and the Left
Alliance, maintained their support for BI in public statements while in
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government, but they did not show any serious attempts to push for its
implementation.
4.2.3 Macro-economic context
BI proposals have been made both in times of economic growth and during
recessions. However, common to all is that they reflected a certain crisis of
consciousness related to economic restructuring and high levels of
unemployment.
Finland experienced rapid economic growth throughout the 1980s. Towards
the end of the decade, the country began the large-scale liberalization of its
economy and foreign credits; this led to the economy overheating and the
economic collapse of the early 1990s. In this deep recession, unemployment
skyrocketed from 3.2% in 1990 to 11.2% in 1992, peaking at 16.6% in 1994.
Although the economic recovery began in late 1993, unemployment remained
persistently high until the end of the decade.
The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed a large-scale restructuring of the
Finnish economy, the increasing automatization of production, and a shift
from the industrial model towards information and service-based production.
Following the 1990s recession, the economic policy paradigm shifted from a
Keynesian demand-based economy to neoclassical theory. This was reflected in
the BI proposals: in the 1980s, the proposals searched for solutions to unem-
ployment, from job sharing and third sector civil work. In the 1990s, on the other
hand, the main concern was to increase the labour supply by improving work
incentives for the unemployed.
Except for the slight downturn at the beginning of the 2000s, the economy
generally grew and the unemployment rate decreased until the financial crisis
of 2008. However, compared to other OECD countries, income inequality
increased rapidly in Finland during the 2000s. As a result of the global financial
crisis, the unemployment rate rose from 6.4% in 2008 to 8.2% in 2009 and
has remained relatively stable in the years since. Although Finland was not hit
hard by the post-2008 crises, the government has continuously introduced
austerity measures, and since 2013, a more serious crisis has postponed and
started to erode the precondition of employment and welfare. In this context, the
latest BI proposals of the Green League (2007) and the Left Alliance (2011) have
been rejected due to the objectives of balancing the budget and the need
to curtail public expenditure. This occurred when both parties were members
of the grand coalition government led by the National Coalition Party and
the SDP.
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4.2.4 Political context
Most of the BI models were released in three main waves. The first was in the
late 1980s in the context of the restructuring of the economy and labour markets,
the second was during the 1990s in the aftermath of the great economic reces-
sion, and latest occurred from 2006 onwards. The political timing of the propo-
sals varied from crisis-ridden public debate to parliamentary elections and the
renewal of political parties’ policy programmes. All four BI models proposed by
the political parties were published before parliamentary elections while the
parties were in opposition. There was a period of silence lasting from the
discursive boom of the mid- and late 1990s until the parliamentary elections of
2007.
Most of the BI proposals reflect their contemporary political climate and the
alleged needs of society: they were, to a greater or lesser extent, made compa-
tible with the paradigms and explicit objectives of public policy. However,
different BI proposals appeal to different values; some might emphasize the
equality and universality that have been the core values of the Nordic welfare
tradition, while others aim for flexibility, reduction of bureaucracy, and the
removal of the incentive-traps central to current policy-making.
The 1980s was still a time of a strong welfare state that nurtured the ideals
of equality and Universalism. Parties of the left, especially the SDP, were
strong. However, the decade also witnessed the emergence of criticism of the
large public sector and the expansion of the welfare state. Those ideas found a
fertile soil in the 1990s recession, which led to the triumph of neo-liberal ideas,
privatization, and continuous cutbacks to the welfare state. The objectives of
equality and the citizens’ well-being were subjected to efficiency and market
competitiveness. After the collapse of Soviet-style socialism in the early 1990s,
the hegemony of the right-wing parties and ideologies grew stronger. The
1980s also experienced an emerging concern over the ecological sustainability
of the prevailing economic model, which is reflected in some of the BI
proposals.
The politics of the twenty-first century has been dominated by the idea of
scarce economic resources and the weakened legitimacy of the welfare state
among the political elites. Since 2003, governments have been led by the Centre
Party or the National Coalition Party, both of which have a favourable stance on
neo-liberal ideas. In party politics, BI has been advanced by actors from the
Green League and the Left Alliance, especially by their youth organizations.
However, there has also been a growing interest in the idea of BI from the right
of the political spectrum.
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4.2.5 Reception and outcomes
Most proposals were noticed by the media, but only a few of them received
greater attention. The models of Osmo Soininvaara (1994), the Centre Party
(1998), the Young Finns (1998, cit. Mattila 2001) and the Green League (2007)
became well known in public debate. Soininvaara’s model appeared immedi-
ately after the deep recession of the early 1990s. It brought the BI discourse,
which had been already established in the 1980s, to the new context of
unprecedentedly high employment and the search for new solutions. The
models of the Centre Party and the Young Finns appeared before parliamen-
tary elections at a time when the high unemployment seemed to persist
despite the government’s various efforts to tackle it; this created an atmo-
sphere that was open to unusual solutions. The Green League’s model played
an important role in reopening the BI debate after the years of silence in the
early 2000s. It received mostly positive reactions in the print media, and it
brought the issue of BI into the pre-election debates of the 2007 parliamen-
tary elections.
Some individual activists like Andersson (1988) and Soininvaara (1994) were
successful in pushing their ideas onto the agendas of their own parties. Due to
Andersson’s activity, the Left Alliance endorsed the idea of BI in its first pro-
gramme in 1990, and the Green League adopted Soininvaara’s model with slight
modifications. Nevertheless, the political position did not guarantee success
even within actor’s own reference group, especially when the proposal con-
flicted the long-established values of the group. For example, Pekka Korpinen
(1989), one of the leading leftist economists at the time, never received support
for his proposal from his own reference group, the SDP. The party has always
been ideologically resistant to BI due to its strong commitment to the ideal of
full employment and work-based social security.5 Despite the fact that BI has
been a part of the party policy programmes when parties have been present in
the government (the Green League in 1995–2003 and 2007–2014, and the Left
Alliance in 1995–2003 and 2011–2014),6 it has never become a part of the
5 Some of the BI models (Soininvaara, 1994, the Centre Party 1998, the Young Finns 1998) have
openly attacked trade unions, labour market regulations and the minimum wage; this has made
the SDP even more resistant to the idea of BI.
6 The proposal of the Left Alliance was formally approved by the party council in November
2012 when the party was in government, but it was first published as a discussion paper before
the 2011 parliamentary elections when the party was in opposition.
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government platform. Though members of parliament have spoken publicly in
favour of BI, the parties have shown no real efforts to push for the implementa-
tion of BI. However, they have successfully introduced minor reforms that have
developed the social security system somewhat in the direction of BI, such as the
guaranteed minimum pension (2011), an increase in minimum unemployment
benefits (2012), the removal of the means-test from the labour market subsidy
(2013), and the right for the unemployed to earn a monthly income of €300
without a cut in benefits (2013).
Some proposals have been discussed in parliament or the ministries. The
sabbatical leave proposal (1984) found its realization in government platforms
and legislation as the “job alternation leave”. However, the idea of BI was
omitted from the model that was eventually implemented. Political parties and
ministries also showed interest to Kati Peltola’s (1997) model of ground income
and civil work. After Anita Mattila’s two models of “adjusted BI” (2001) were
published, the Green League made a (unsuccessful) legislative initiative for a
municipal experiment of BI. The pre-election debate in 2007 was an important
factor behind the new government’s decision to set up a committee for reforming
social protection (2007–2009). However, the committee’s mandate did not
include BI and it largely failed in its mission to introduce substantial reforms
in social protection to tackle poverty traps and provide sufficient basic social
security for all.
5 Discussion
The history of social policies reveals that it is very rare for social innovations to
become reality without compromise and the consent of the larger political
spheres. One of the Achilles heels of social security reform seems to concern
the relationship between work and the right to income (i.e. the labour contract).
The proposed disentanglement of the right to a (minimum) income from
labour market participation or an active search of employment has often been
confronted with moral indignation. This seems to limit the scope for social
innovations, despite the fact that various labour market and social policy
experts have suggested either a disengagement of work and social security
(Bercusson et al., 1996; Ekstrand, 1996; Sipilä, 1979; Vobruba, 2006) or a wider
concept of work including new forms of paid and non-paid work (Beck, 1998;
Koistinen, 2011; Peltola, 1997).
Innovations that are regarded as too radical by the majority often gain
support from marginal political groups, but not from those in power (Rogers,
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1962; Wejnert, 2002, p. 305). The initiators of BI models tried to tackle this
challenge by presenting their models as a partial renewal of the existing sys-
tems, rather than as introducing a new, radically different principle. Rather than
promoting a Universalist concept of social justice, they oriented their proposals
to solving pragmatic problems (see Halmetoja, 2012). Instead of proposing a real
freedom of choice and the voluntariness of work, as advocated by most theorists
of BI (Birnbaum, 2012; Van Parijs, 1995, 2006; White, 2006) most of the models
were justified by certain preconditions – work, social activity, or education.
When freedom was spoken of, it was often limited to certain socially acceptable
activities.
Although BI gained support from parties and individuals in fairly powerful
positions that support proved to be rather fluid. Apart from academics and free
writers outside the political elites, actors did not show a strong commitment to
the idea of BI, and many of them seemed to be ready to swallow their previous
ideals when moving into the positions where they could really act. This phe-
nomenon has been noted by De Wispelaere and Noguera (2012, pp. 22–23), who
argue that often when actors climb the political ladder, they become unwilling
to invest their political resources (money, time, effort, and political capital) or
compromise their other goals to further the highly controversial proposals such
as BI. De Wispelaere and Noguera also argue that in this sense, support for BI is
“cheap” – it is often subjugated to issues that are perceived to be more urgent
and non-controversial.
One of the paradoxes of BI is that it seems to find its “policy window” in times
of crisis and high unemployment (Julkunen, 2009), but during those periods,
politicians are rarely willing to introduce new, potentially costly reforms. This
seems to be true especially in the context of current financial crisis, despite the
fact that the Green League (2007) and the Left Alliance (2011) have produced more
elaborate models and cost–benefit calculations. On the other hand, during times
of economic prosperity and low unemployment, reform is often considered less
topical. Another paradox is that there is no model that would at the same time
provide adequate social security and be cost-neutral. Proposals that might be
acceptable for the political right are not for the left and vice versa. The proposal of
the Green League (2007) seemed to gather most support across the political
spectrum, since it was formulated in very neutral terms.
The adherents of BI were not successful in the implementation of the
system, but they have been successful enough to keep the discourse alive for
over 25 years. This seems to verify once again that social ideas are not realized
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overnight: they may come true over time if the actors are strong and the ideas
are mature. Studies on social policy reforms verify the importance of institu-
tional constrains, power resources, the socio-economic context, and the long
gestation of ideas before they become a reality. We can repeat once again the
argument of Richard Titmuss, who in the latter stage of his life and creativity
concluded that “decades of accumulated rights, contributions, expectations,
anomalies and inequities are inherited. They cannot be corrected overnight but
they can be resolved over time; thus two of the issues are: how quickly and for
whom?” (Titmuss, 1974, p. 131).
6 Conclusions
Despite the relatively widespread interest in BI in the context of the Nordic
welfare system, the Finnish case demonstrates the difficulties and repeated
failures of the implementation of this idea.
The motivations, reasons, and arguments for BI initiatives vary over time,
socio-economic context, and political landscape. Most proposals studied here
have had a short shelf life, but the concept never really went away. Instead,
it always re-emerged in a slightly different form. The idea of BI has spread
across society, first from a few academics to political activists, and through
them to political parties. The authors of the BI models also learned on the
way; the latter BI models were in many ways more developed than the earlier
ones.
However, all of the proposals were more or less individual attempts by one
activist or political party with no real effort to mobilize a strong consensus to
drive the model. It seems that BI was not a high priority on the actors’ agendas,
and they lacked the commitment and effort to advance it, especially when they
reached a position in which they could act.
In order to understand the preconditions of the BI proposals and the
reasons for their non-realization, a more detailed analysis of each case
and comprehensive and systematic information on the context, players, and
process of reception is required. The innovation and agenda-setting theories –
if applied carefully and systematically, and on adequate data – may
help to identify the critical points of the successes and failures of the BI
initiatives.
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